These reports boasted about a “hundreds of kilometers underground” drone nest. This base is in “northwest Iran,” according to the regime’s state television, and “our cameraman was not allowed to enter the base.”

Iran’s state television aired a propaganda film on May 27 depicting the country’s so-called “313 strategic drone headquarters.” The rattling came amid ongoing protests in many Iranian cities, as well as several operations against regime officials and military sites, and was meant to project a hollow show of power. Many Iranian outlets reported that Mohammad Bagheri, the regime’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, had visited the “secretive” and highly “secured” drone headquarters just hours before Tehran’s ridiculous antics.

These reports boasted about a “hundreds of kilometers underground” drone nest. This base is in “northwest Iran,” according to the regime’s state television, and “our cameraman was not allowed to enter the base.”However, some state-run media have slammed a “clumsy” report that inadvertently “shared information about the location of the drone headquarters.”

“We flew from the first base of Air Force. He boasted, “I was unaware of the existence [of the drone nest], a

nd after a few minutes, they told me that I should continue the path blindfolded.”He then displayed the helicopter’s flight path, stating that “they arrived at the underground base after about 40 minutes of flight.”In an article titled “IRIB’s Intelligence Mistakes Reveal the Whereabouts of Army’s Clandestine Base,” the state-run Khabarfori website criticized the report.

Some state-run media have slammed a “clumsy” report that inadvertently “shared information about the location of the drone headquarters.”

“There are two major errors in the IRIB news that have revealed the base’s location. The reporter mentions a 40-minute flight from Kermanshah Air Base to the destination, where the relative coordinates of the base can be found,” according to the report.The report continued, “The more significant mistake is the name on a fire extinguisher that revealed the base’s location, the city of Dalahou in Kermanshah.”

In addition to the Khabarfouri website, many Iranian Twitter users guessed the location of the UAV headquarters based on the regime’s information.There’s a chance that the regime intentionally leaked this information as part of its counterintelligence operation, especially in light of recent attacks on its facilities and the assassination of top commanders.

However, understanding the regime’s current situation dispels any doubt that this sabre-rattling reveals the mullahs’ weakness and is a humiliating failure in any scenario.Due to the regime’s institutionalized corruption, ineptitude, and mismanagement, protests are spreading across the country. While Iranians struggle to make ends meet, the ruling theocracy wastes billions of dollars on warmongering and terrorism, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Due to the regime’s institutionalized corruption, ineptitude, and mismanagement, protests are spreading across the country. While Iranians struggle to make ends meet, the ruling theocracy wastes billions of dollars on warmongering and terrorism.

In October 2021, the Iranian Resistance revealed the regime’s covert massive UAV program. “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force is primarily using various UAVs for terrorist operations as well as supplying its proxies in the region,” according to this report. To an extent, the regime is trying to compensate for its outdated and decrepit Air Force with this technology.”

The regime’s recent empty display of power is primarily intended to boost the morale of its disgruntled forces, who see a volatile society and another uprising on the horizon. Furthermore, recent attacks in the heart of the capital against regime officials and military sites reveal the true face of a weak regime as well as the many flaws in its security apparatus.

As the Iranian Resistance had proposed in October, “Any dealings with the regime in Tehran by all Western sides, especially after the ascendance of Raisi, must end. All activities, including production, use, and research on drones and the regime’s missile program, must be included in the demands. Otherwise, because of its severe domestic weaknesses, the clerical regime will place more emphasis on creating regional instability to buy time and preserve its rule.

While the regime’s terrorist threats must be taken seriously, the regime’s UAV program reveals the regime’s weak Air Force from a military standpoint.

MEK Iran (follow us on Twitter and Facebook), Maryam Rajavi’s on her site, Twitter & Facebook, NCRI  (Twitter & Facebook), and People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran – MEK IRAN – YouTu