EU Must Stop Mullahs Appeasement
The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), and the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI / MEK Iran), to this day, European politicians have mostly dismissed any legitimate criticism of their approach to the Iranian nuclear issue. From the time the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was first conceived in 2015 until now, they have done so.
Iran began breaking the JCPOA’s terms
When Iran began systematically breaking the JCPOA’s terms in early 2019, it didn’t take long for the country’s uranium enrichment level to rise from the authorized 3.67 percent fissile purity to 4.5 percent.
The regime had already returned to its 2015 high point of 20 percent enrichment by the time it formally stated that it would no longer be adhering to any of the limits. The Natanz nuclear plant has already achieved a uranium enrichment level of at least 63 percent, utilizing cascades of centrifuges far more advanced than those that Iran was allowed to keep running while the JCPOA was in operation.
Iran’s seeking a nuclear weapon
Its present level raises major doubts about Iran’s true “breakout period” for a nuclear weapon. These issues will not be resolved simply by returning to the status quo that prevailed prior to the US withdrawal and the ensuing Iranian provocations.
Nonetheless, European negotiators continue to undertake direct negotiations with Iranian counterparts in Vienna with the only, short-sighted goal of achieving this.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s director-general, Rafael Grossi, has been a key figure in keeping the JCPOA afloat during this period of American absence and Iranian non-compliance.
Return to the JCPOA is impossible
Last week, though, Grossi stated that a return to the JCPOA is “impossible,” and that what is required today is “an agreement within an agreement or an implementation roadmap” that addresses the regime’s newest nuclear developments as well as its long-standing refusal to cooperate.
With the exception of recent breaches, non-cooperation has been on display practically since the outset of the JCPOA implementation, when a military location was suspected of hosting clandestine nuclear operations. Two more sites were discovered subsequently, and the IAEA was eventually able to confirm the presence of radioactive material at all three.
Europe does not demand answers from the dictatorship
As long as European authorities do not actively demand answers, it is safe to presume that Iran will continue to have no answers to these queries. And it’s safe to anticipate that the dictatorship will continue to downplay the significance of its most recent effort as long as it feels emboldened to keep the facts of its earlier efforts hidden.
Iran’s Intelligence Minister, Mahmoud Alavi, claimed at the start of this year that if “pushed” by its Western opponents, Iran would consider acquiring nuclear weapons. The remarks came the closest to public acknowledgment of the Iranian nuclear program’s military purpose yet, and it had no obvious impact on the Vienna talks.
The European strategy in Vienna from now on should not be to persuade Iran with new compromises but to push it to accept new demands, particularly ones that address Grossi’s worries about the worrying current state of the nuclear program.