By Published On: January 17, 2024Categories: NEWS
As the date for Iran's parliamentary elections draws near, the anxiety within the regime, particularly that of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, intensifies significantly.

As the date for Iran’s parliamentary elections draws near, the anxiety within the regime, particularly that of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, intensifies significantly.

 

The country is ensnared in a daunting deadlock, grappling with societal unrest teetering on the brink of eruption. The mere interaction between regime insiders is now potent enough to serve as a catalyst for widespread public dissent.

Khamenei’s Friday prayer leaders have issued stark reminders, urging that the lessons of the 2009 uprising not be disregarded and remain etched in the historical memory of the Iranian populace. This collective recollection of past unrest serves as a grim harbinger for the regime, underlining the volatile state of the nation.

Compounding Khamenei’s woes is the looming threat of a mass election boycott, a move that could starkly underscore the regime’s lack of legitimacy. Such a boycott could effectively transform the election into a de facto referendum against the regime, elevating the risk of another uprising.

 

 

Iran's unresolved crises manifest visibly nationwide, particularly in marginalized areas like the city of Karaj and its environs in Alborz province.

Iran’s unresolved crises manifest visibly nationwide, particularly in marginalized areas like the city of Karaj and its environs in Alborz province.

 

The persistent unrest here is reflective of deep-seated public discontent. A report from the state-run Ham-Mihan newspaper highlights the growing unease in these regions, attributing it to the transformation of temporary residences into permanent ones, sparking widespread protests in recent years.

However, the root causes of unrest in these cities transcend mere urban development issues. They are deeply rooted in systemic poverty, oppression, injustice, and discrimination. These societal ills are especially pronounced on the fringes of urban centers, fueling a rebellious spirit among the populace.

 

 

Contrary to the regime's intentions, increased repression in these areas has correlated directly with the intensity of protests.

Contrary to the regime’s intentions, increased repression in these areas has correlated directly with the intensity of protests.

 

The regime’s reliance on suppression, exemplified by the proliferation of prisons, has only served to fan the flames of public dissent. The Ham-Mihan newspaper notes that the presence of multiple prisons in Karaj, including Kachooi, the Central Prison, Rajai Shahr, and Ghezal Hesar, has contributed to political stagnation and a surge in social challenges, including crime and cultural unrest.

The vibrancy of the 2022 uprising, particularly in the form of protests by prisoners’ families against unjust sentences, highlights the counterproductive impact of these prisons. The events of January 8, 2023, are a case in point, where the transfer of Mohammad Ghobadlou and Mohammad Boroujeni to solitary confinement sparked large-scale protests, forcing the regime to eventually shut down Gohardasht Prison.

The people in these regions have endured intensified oppression and injustice under the mullahs’ rule, facing disproportionate harassment and judicial persecution. Reports from Ham-Mihan reveal that actions deemed normal in Tehran can attract severe legal consequences in cities like Karaj, only 30 kilometers away.

 

 

 

On January 3, 2024, Khamenei’s statement equating election opposition with opposition to the Islamic Republic only served to amplify public animosity. His own regime’s statistics, indicating a staggering 96% hostility towards him, have likely escalated even further.

In the face of this, Iranians, particularly those in peripheral areas, are casting their votes not at the ballot box, but on the streets through continued protests. Khabar Online reports that in Alborz province, for instance, voter turnout in previous elections barely reached 2% to 3%, a stark indication of the public’s disenchantment with the regime.

 

 


MEK Iran (follow us on Twitter and Facebook), Maryam Rajavi’s on her siteTwitter & Facebook, NCRI  (Twitter & Facebook), and People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran – MEK IRAN – YouTu

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